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ARTICLES
ADVANCING TOWARD UNIVERSAL COVERAGE:
ARE STATES ABLE TO TAKE THE LEAD? +

LISA DUBAY, Sc.M.*
CHRISTINA MOYLAN, M.H.S.*
THOMAS R. OLIVER, PH.D., M.H.A.*

INTRODUCTION

The number of Americans without health insurance exceeds forty-three
million, and leaders at all levels of the political system are again raising the
question of whether the United States can and should pursue universal health
coverage through public policy. A second but equally important question is
whether the pursuit of universal coverage is best initiated at the federal or state
level. National, comprehensive strategies to assure health coverage for all
While federal
Americans have had little success over the past century.'

+ This

article is based on the presentation of the same name by Thomas R. Oliver at the conference,

State Efforts to Expand Health Care Coverage: Current Realities, Future Possibilities? held at the
University of Maryland School of Law Baltimore, MD, on November 18, 2002.
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School of Public Health.
**Christina Moylan, M.H.S., is a doctoral student at the Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public
Health. Previously, she worked for the Michigan Public Health Institute helping to develop and
implement community-based models for expanding health care access. She has also worked on
implementation of the State Children's Health Insurance Program at the Centers for Medicare and
Medicaid Services.
"**Thomas R. Oliver, Ph.D., is Associate Professor of Health Policy and Management at the Johns
Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health. Professor Oliver attended Stanford University where he
received his bachelor's degree in Human Biology. He received a master's degree in health
administration from Duke University and a doctorate in political science from the University of North
Carolina at Chapel Hill. His most recent work focuses on the political history of Medicare and
prescription drug coverage; state efforts to expand health insurance coverage; the role of foundations in
shaping health policy; variations in Medicare payments for graduate medical education; and, generally,
the roles and strategies of leaders in health policy innovation.
1. See generally THEODORE R. MARMOR, THE POLITICS OF MEDICARE (2d ed. 2000); THEDA
BOOMERANG: CLINTON'S HEALTH SECURITY EFFORT AND THE TURN AGAINST
SKOCPOL,

GOVERNMENT INU.S. POLITICS (1996); David J. Rothman, A Century of Failure: Health Care Reform
in America, 18 J. HEALTH POL., POL'Y & L. 271 (1993) (noting the failure of a national health care
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policymakers debated and ultimately defeated proposals to provide universal
coverage, a few states demonstrated that the obstacles to comprehensive reform
can be overcome and that it is possible to approach, if not completely reach, the
goal of universal coverage. What was it about these states that made such action
possible and can it be replicated in others? What role would the federal
government have to play to assure success of a state-based strategy to achieve
universal coverage?
This article explores three alternative strategies for achieving universal
coverage, debates the merits and limitations of each, and examines lessons learned
from previous federal and state initiatives. The article concludes with observations
about the most feasible course of action to achieve the goal of universal coverage
and sets forth the elements of a successful federal-state partnership in this regard.
The analysis that follows sets forth the reasons why, for the foreseeable future,
comprehensive reform is not likely to be enacted at the federal level. We argue
that a state-based path to universal coverage is plausible, but without a
considerable federal commitment of resources and perhaps relief from the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), universal coverage for the
nation will remain a dream for its advocates.

THE INCREMENTAL BIAS IN AMERICAN HEALTH POLICY

Universal health insurance coverage remains elusive in the United States,
not because the American public disagrees with universal coverage as an
appropriate end, but because of entrenched interests and disagreement over the
means for achieving this goal. A recent poll conducted by the Kaiser Family
Foundation found that two-thirds of Americans agree that the federal government
should guarantee universal health coverage for all Americans.2 However, the same
poll found that Americans were divided about whether government should make a
limited or a major effort to provide coverage for the uninsured.3
Over the years, a wide range of proposals have been floated to address the
problems of the uninsured, including new public insurance programs, insurance
market reforms, tax credits, and comprehensive overhauls of the entire health care
system. Yet efforts by several presidents over a span of five decades to establish a
national system of health insurance have failed and, despite some comprehensive

system to develop throughout the past century); Sven Steinmo & Jon Watts, It's the Institutions, Stupid!
Why Comprehensive National Health InsuranceAlways Fails in America, 20 J. HEALTH POL., POL'Y &

L. 329-372 (1995).
2. THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., KAISER HEALTH POLL REPORT: PUBLIC OPINION ON

THE UNINSURED

(Jan./Feb. 2003), available at http://headlines.kff.org/healthpollreport/templates
/summary.php?feature=feature3 (last visited Jan. 31, 2004).

3. Id.
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legislative initiatives, few states have come close to providing universal coverage.
In the past decade, federal action moved swiftly from the comprehensive reform
plan of the Clinton administration and Republican proposals to radically overhaul
Medicare and Medicaid, to a more selective, incremental series of initiatives such
as the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA) 4, the
State Children's Health Insurance Program (SCHIP) 5, the Medicare+Choice
program, and proposals to provide outpatient prescription drug coverage for
Medicare beneficiaries. 6
The inability of the United States to achieve universal coverage at either the
federal or state level is perhaps best explained by Charles Lindblom's theory that7
public policy typically develops through a process of "disjointed incrementaism."
He argues that policy makers accomplish change by limiting their focus to
incremental alternatives, differing only slightly from status quo policies. 8 They are
constrained by "bounded rationality," and do not consider all possible policy
options or weigh all possible consequences. 9 Instead, policy is remedial rather
than proactive, and policy makers tend to seek agreement on current, discrete
problems that need to be addressed (e.g., uninsured children, seniors without
prescription drug coverage, portability of insurance across jobs) rather than attempt
to reach agreement on more fundamental policy goals (e.g., the desirability of
0
expanding coverage through public versus private insurance programs).'
The incrementalist perspective also recognizes the role of interest groups and
Due to what Lindblom calls the "social
negotiation in policy making.
fragmentation of analysis," even when everyone agrees there is a problem, the

4. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat.
1936 (1996) (codified in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C.).
5. Balanced Budget Act of 1997, § 4901,42 U.S.C.A §§ 1397aa - 1397jj (West 2003).
6. See generally DAVID G. SMITH, ENTITLEMENT POLITICS: MEDICARE AND MEDICAID, 19952001 (2002) (arguing that both the ambitious Clinton health care plan and the Republican sponsored
Contract with America tried to enact sweeping policy reforms which were unsuccessful; instead, future
reform must be the product of bipartisan efforts which constitute small alterations to the current health
care system rather than sweeping change); Mark A. Peterson, The Politics of Health Care Policy:
Overreaching in an Era of Polarization,in THE SOCIAL DIVIDE: POLITICAL PARTIES AND THE FUTURE

OF ACTIVIST GOVERNMENT 181 (Margaret Weir ed., 1998) (detailing the politics surrounding the health
care reform proposals under President Clinton and a Republican Congress).
7. See Charles E. Lindblom, The Science of "'MuddlingThrough," 14 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 79, 8487 (1959) (discussing incrementalist theory as a means for public policy formulation) [hereinafter
Lindblom, Science of Muddling Through]; Charles E. Lindblom, Still Muddling, Not Yet Through, 39
PUB.ADMIN. REV. 517, 518-19 (1979) (further clarifying incrementalist theory by distinguishing simple
incremental analysis, disjointed incrementalism, and strategic analysis) [hereinafter Lindblom, Still
Muddling].
8. Lindblom, Still Muddling, supra note 7, at 520.
9. Lindblom, Still Muddling,supra note 7, at 518.
10. Lindblom, Science of Muddling Through, supra note 7, at 84.

JOURNAL OF HEALTH CARE LAW & POLICY

[VOL. 7:1

solution is crafted by way of negotiation and compromise.l' Michael Hayes notes
that this process generally leads to watered-down policy outcomes, "given a lack of
consensus on means or ends, outcomes will represent little more than lowest
12
common denominators acceptable to a sufficient number to permit action."'
Under these conditions, "[l]arge policy change will occur gradually, if at all,
through a process of feedback or 'successive approximations' as experience with
minor policy changes gives rise to new demands for modification or expansion,
setting off a new policy cycle."' 13 In essence, the policy process is never-ending.
The theory of incrementalism is often used not only to explain but also to
justify policy outcomes. Hayes, for example, acknowledges the argument that
incremental or small changes produce better results than comprehensive reforms
because it gives policymakers the opportunity to propose solutions, learn from
14
their errors, and make corrections downstream.
Hayes also argues that other features in the U.S. political system create a
significant bias in favor of incremental policy change. 15 These include the
disproportionate political resources and influence of interest groups that oppose
redistributive and regulatory reform; the lack of cohesive political parties; and the
constitutional design of American government, which fragments power and
establishes procedural hurdles that require large majorities to enact major
reforms. 16 Some critics consider these institutional barriers to be the primary
17
culprit in the death of the Clinton health plan, for example.
This theory, however, does not account for the fact that, in the last two
decades, the federal government and a handful of states have adopted important
reforms-many of them quite comprehensive-in a short time period. At the
federal level, the enactment of the State Children's Health Insurance Program
(SCHIP) as part of the Balanced Budget Act of 1997 was a major milestone that
established a new basis for public health insurance coverage and opened up a new
stream of federal funding for that purpose. The initial scope of the program is
modest -overall enrollment of SCHIP hovers around four million while the
8
Medicare and Medicaid programs each have around forty million beneficiaries.'

11. See DAVID BRAYBROOKE & CHARLES E. LINDBLOM, A STRATEGY OF DECISION 104 (1963)

(noting that policy formulation is fragmented between many points, hence, compromise and negotiation
are required between the participating actors).
12. MICHAEL T. HAYES, INCREMENTALISM AND PUBLIC POLICY 13 (1992).

13.
14.
15.
16.

Id.
Id. at 20.
Id. at 27.
Id. at 27-40.
17. See, e.g., Hugh Heclo, The Clinton Health Plan: HistoricalPerspective, 14 HEALTH AFF. 86,
94-97 (1995); Steinmo & Watts, supranote 1,at 334-36; 361-65 (1995).
18. CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., FY 2003 FIRST QUARTER EVER ENROLLED DATA

BY STATE - TOTAL SCHIP, available at http://www.cms.gov/schip/er2003q1.pdf (last visited Jan. 31,
2004) (listing the total number of children ever enrolled in SCHIP for the first quarter of 2003); CTRS.
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However, SCHIP sets an important precedent, and if children's health insurance or
expansions to other populations became an even higher priority, the institutional
framework to incrementally expand insurance to well over ten million beneficiaries
is now in place. In the 2004 presidential campaign, indeed, several Democratic
candidates have proposed guaranteeing coverage to all children and in some cases,
young adult dependents. 19 At the state level, a few states were able to initiate
complex overhauls of their health care systems to provide near-universal
coverage. 2°
These major initiatives support John Kingdon's contention that deviation
from incrementalism is possible when an abrupt shift in how a problem is
perceived, or in who controls the levers of governmental power, opens a "window
of opportunity" for policy innovation.2' If advocates are able to couple their
preferred policy alternative with the prevailing problem definition and political
conditions, then robust change can occur within a short timeframe.22 These early
successes lead us to question what factors were in place to facilitate change and
whether they can be replicated in the near future.

STRATEGIES FOR ADVANCING TOWARD UNIVERSAL COVERAGE

Jonathan Oberlander and Theodore Marmor surveyed past and current
proposals for reform and concluded that there are three basic strategies for
achieving universal coverage.23 They categorize these options as "federalist,"
"pincer," or "single payer" in design.24 Although this is not an exhaustive set of
strategies, Oberlander and Marmor provide an excellent organizational framework
from which to launch a discussion about how to achieve universal health care
coverage in the United States and the essential role of the states if there is to be any
immediate progress toward that goal.
The "federalist" strategy, according to Oberlander and Marmor, relies on a
combination of state-driven innovation and substantial federal resources, rules, and

FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., 2002 DATA COMPENDIUM, available at http://www.cms.gov
/researchers/pubs/datacompendium/2002 (last visited Jan. 31, 2004) (listing enrollment figures for the
Medicare and Medicaid programs).
19. See SARA R. COLLINS ET AL., THE COMMONWEALTH FUND, HEALTH CARE REFORM RETURNS
TO THE NATIONAL AGENDA: THE 2004 PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATES' PROPOSALS (2003), available at
http://www.cmwf.org/programs/insurance/collinsreformagenda 671 .pdf (last visited Jan. 31, 2004).

20. See infra notes 144-47 and accompanying text (discussing the efforts by several states toward
universal health coverage).
21. JOHN W. KINGDON, AGENDAS, ALTERNATIVES, AND PUBLIC POLICIES 165-70 (2d ed. 1995).
22. Id.
23. Jonathan Oberlander & Theodore R. Marmor, The Path to Universal Health Care, in THE
NEXT AGENDA: A BLUEPRINT FOR THE NEW PROGRESSIVE MOVEMENT 93, 110-16 (Robert L. Borosage
& Roger Hickey eds. 2001).
24. Id.
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oversight. While states can enact comprehensive reforms entirely on their own,
this strategy relies on the federal government to provide states with financial
incentives and a legal framework to encourage broad-based coverage and
benefits.26 The federal regulatory role is limited; however, states would ultimately
decide whom to cover, what benefits to offer, and how to structure the delivery
system.27 Depending on conditions in the state's health care system and political
leadership, some states might put primary emphasis on expanding employer-based
insurance, others might expand existing public insurance programs, and still others
might create a single-payer system.
In 2003, the Institute of Medicine
recommended such a strategy: it proposed that the U.S. federal government assist
several states to establish universal coverage programs to demonstrate their
28
feasibility and assess alternative program designs.
The overarching premise of the federalist strategy is that once a sufficient
number of states develop systems of universal coverage, other states will be
compelled to follow and consequently, the federal government will be persuaded to
facilitate the transition to universal coverage in every state.29 This is, in fact, the
strategy that led to the present-day Canadian health insurance system. Beginning
with Saskatchewan in 1947, other provinces adopted universal coverage and in
1971 the federal government in Ottawa approved the development of provincial
health plans across the country.30
Oberlander and Marmor note that the federalist strategy is consistent with
contemporary political ideology in the U.S. 31 It stresses state autonomy and
federal flexibility, and allows room for state-to-state variation. 32 They also argue
that it "offers an opportunity to unify advocates of reform who agree on the goal of
universal coverage but disagree on which plan should be adopted to reach that
goal. 33 The researchers caution, however, that it would require a significant
investment of federal funding to assure coverage for all segments of the population

25. Id. at 110. For a similar approach, with a stronger federal role, see James Tallon, Jr. & Richard
Nathan, Federal/StatePartnershipfor Health System Reform, 11 HEALTH AFF. 7-16 (1992).

26. Oberlander & Marmor, supra note 23, at 111.
27. Oberlander & Marmor, supra note 23, at 111.
28. INST. OF MED. OF THE NAT'L ACADEMIES, FOSTERING RAPID ADVANCES IN HEALTH CARE:

LEARNING FROM SYSTEM DEMONSTRATIONS, 69-78 (Janet M. Corrigan et al.
eds., 2002); cf Henry J.
Aaron & Stuart M. Butler, Four Steps to Better Health Care,WASH. POST, July 6, 2003, at B7 (arguing
that the federal government should encourage the proliferation of state health care plans by making an
increase in federal funds received by the state contingent upon increasing the number of individuals
insured).
29. See Oberlander & Marmor, supra note 23, at 122.
30. See HEALTH

CANADA,

CANADA

HEALTH

ACT

OVERVIEW (2002)

at http://www.hc-

sc.gc.ca/english/media/releases/2002/healthact/overview.htm (last updated Aug. 1, 2003) (providing
evolution of the Canada Health Act, Canada's federal health insurance legislation).
31. Oberlander & Marmor, supra note 23, at 110.
32. Oberlander & Marmor, supra note 23, at 112.
33. Oberlander & Marmor, supra note 23, at 110.
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and there has not been, as of yet, a political willingness to put these dollars on the
table. 34 They also acknowledge that state-by-state variation is a double-edged
sword and that critics would argue that the federalist strategy, with its potential to
allow even more variation than the status quo, exacerbates an already inequitable
system. 35 Finally, they question whether the main result of such a strategy would
be to shift the burden of breaking political deadlock from the federal to the state
level. 36
Oberlander and Marmor describe the "pincer" strategy as a more incremental
approach than the federalist strategy.37 It builds upon the status quo by expanding
coverage in two directions: 1) by raising age and income eligibility from current
Medicaid and SCHIP guidelines and removing categorical restrictions; and 2) by
lowering age and income eligibility from Medicare guidelines.38 It emphasizes
expansion of Medicaid and SCHIP to include coverage for working adults with
low-incomes, a population that currently represents the largest portion of the
uninsured.39
The federal government's role is more prominent under this strategy because
states would need to negotiate with the federal government for changes in the
many rules governing coverage and financing in public insurance programs. As
the recent history of Medicaid expansion and SCHIP development illustrates, the
pincer strategy also relies upon federal mandates or generous subsidies to
encourage state expansion of coverage. 40 The advantages of the pincer strategy,
according to Oberlander and Marmor, are: 1) that modest expansions of eligibility
have the potential to make a significant dent in the number of uninsured; 2) that it
builds upon existing programs so there is no additional "administrative innovation"
required; and 3) that covering low-income working adults and soon-to-be retirees
could be politically appealing, yielding additional support and votes from these
populations. 41 Their primary caution is whether building on these programs will be
as successful as believed, given that Medicaid and SCHIP already have millions of
individuals and families who are eligible but not enrolled in the programs.42 In
addition, providers sharply criticize low payments for services and poor program
administration, especially in Medicaid, and their low participation rate limits the
accessibility and quality of care available to beneficiaries. This raises the question

34. Oberlander & Marmor, supra note 23, at 112.
35. Oberlander & Marmor, supra note 23, at 112.

36. Oberlander & Marmor, supra note 23, at 112.
37. Oberlander & Marmor, supra note 23, at 112.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

Oberlander
Oberlander
Obelander
Oberlander
Oberlander

&
&
&
&
&

Marmor,
Marmor,
Marmor,
Marmor,
Marmor,

supra note 23, at 112.
supra note 23, at 113.
supra note 23, at 113.
supra note 23, at 113.
supra note 23, at 113-14.
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of whether building on a "flawed system" to expand coverage will yield desired
results.
Oberlander and Marmor liken the proposed "single-payer" strategy to the
development of the U.S. Medicare program: its proponents needed over a decade
to move the idea from conception in 1951 to enactment in 1965. 43 Its success
required building a strong, sustained coalition that could persist until the larger
political environment shifted and convinced key public officials that expanding
44
health coverage would reap political benefits.

The goal of the single-payer strategy is to establish the federal government as
the sole payer for, and decision maker about, covered health benefits and
services. 45
Oberlander & Marmor note that single-payer systems tend to
emphasize comprehensiveness of care, accessibility to services, low administrative
costs, and portability of coverage.46 Such systems are also more easily understood
by the public, have more professional autonomy and patient choice, and develop
broad political support once they are enacted.4 7
Oberlander and Marmor recognize some disadvantages of single-payer
systems, including centrally-imposed limitations on health care services and items
such as prescription drugs, constant media attention, and immense pressure on
politicians with respect to budgets, access to services, and other issues. 48 They
also concede that the single-payer strategy would likely be a lengthy, uphill battle
in the United States, as it has been defeated many times in the past and would
certainly meet fierce resistance from a wide array of influential interest groups. 49

THE LIMITS OF THE SINGLE PAYER STRATEGY: FEDERAL DISTRACTION AND

DISINTEREST

What is the most likely strategy for achieving universal coverage? For a
number of reasons, progress in the near future must rely heavily on state action.
The following section outlines how competing issues, a deepening fiscal crisis, and
partisan priorities will almost certainly prohibit concerted federal action on behalf
of the uninsured.

43. See Oberlander & Marrmor, supra note 23, at 114-15, 117-19; MARMOR, supra note 1.
44. Oberlander & Marmor, supra note 23, at 114-15, 117-19.
45. Oberlander & Marmor, supra note 23, at 114.
46. Oberlander & Marmor, supra note 23, at 114. (using the Canadian Medicare program as an
illustration of the dominant model of a single-payer health insurance program).
47. Oberlander & Marmor, supra note 23, at 115.
48. Oberlander & Marmor, supra note 23, at 114-15.
49. Oberlander & Marmor, supra note 22, at 115.
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Focus on InternationalTerrorism and HomelandSecurity
Since the events of September and October 2001, the Bush Administration
and Congress have focused heavily on security concerns and the subsequent wars
with Afghanistan and Iraq. Foreign policy has dominated the policy agenda and
domestic issues have taken a backseat, including concerns about the economy and
the corresponding increase in the already large ranks of the uninsured.

Republican Dominance in FederalPolicy
Even absent the current security concerns and war, it is doubtful that
universal coverage enacted from the federal level would be a priority for the
current Republican administration or the Republican leadership in Congress. Carol
Weissert and William Weissert explain that comprehensive reform tends to be the
policy choice of Democrats, while Republicans opt instead for incremental
proposals, "typically offering voluntary participation, voluntary risk pools with
subsidies to states to form pools for those at high risk, means testing, substantial
co-payments or catastrophic coverage, and a limited range of benefits." 50 Indeed,
the recent resurgence of interest in universal coverage has occurred almost
exclusively within the Democratic Party, triggered by former Senator Bill
Bradley's proposals in the 2000 presidential campaign and a host of proposals
from Rep. Dick Gephardt and other Democratic presidential contenders for the
51
2004 election.

FederalBudget Deficits
The economic prosperity of the late 1990s yielded budget surpluses that
provided sufficient wiggle room for both the federal and state governments to
explore various alternatives, even alternatives that cost the government a
significant amount of money. In fact, state planning grants supported by the
Health Resources and Services Administration (HRSA) required states to conduct
analyses and develop implementation plans for achieving universal insurance
coverage. 52 Kingdon notes that "When the economy is growing ... more slack
resources are available to government for innovation."5 3 The return of large

50. CAROL S. WEISSERT & WILLIAM G. WEISSERT, GOVERNING HEALTH: THE POLITICS OF

HEALTH POLICY 296 (1st ed. 1996).
51. See, e.g., COLLINS ET AL., supra note 19 (highlighting and comparing the health care reform
proposals of the six Democratic candidates with the proposal submitted by President Bush as part of his
FY 2003 Budget submission).
52. See generally KINGDON, supra note 21.

53. KINGDON, supra note 21, at 108.
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federal budget deficits, however, makes it close to impossible that any healthrelated initiative requiring large federal financial commitments will occur in the
near future.
The U.S. economy began to slide into a recession in 2000 after almost a
decade of robust growth, a decline hastened and deepened by the events of
September 2001.
In Fiscal Year 2002, the United States posted its first year of
deficit since 1998, and the deficit numbers have been growing ever since. 55 In
Fiscal Year 2003, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) reported that the deficit
was $401 billion and that number was projected to grow substantially to support
the war and occupation in Iraq.56 The deficit is compounded by federal tax cuts
enacted in 2001 that are to be phased in for the rest of the decade. The CBO
projects that in Fiscal Year 2004, the federal budget deficit will reach a record
$480 billion.57 Since Congress and President Bush have agreed on additional tax
cuts, the deficit will likely rise even higher.
Although federal politicians are no longer officially setting limits on budget
deficits, pressure to bring deficits under control is likely to increase, and as a result,
put major new high-cost initiatives at a disadvantage compared to more
incremental options.

CurrentFederalHealth Proposalsand Priorities
The health policy initiatives put forth by the Bush Administration to date
clearly indicate that it has no plans for the federal government to play a significant
role in moving toward universal coverage. Although the American public prefers
taking care of those without any health insurance first, 58 politicians of both parties
have focused primarily on addressing the inadequacies of Medicare-particularly,
its lack of coverage for outpatient prescription drugs.59

54. See generally Robert J. Shiller, A Recession Unlike Any Other, WALL ST. J., Nov. 27, 2001, at

A22 (commenting on the nature of the recession and the effects of September 11 th).
55. CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, THE BUDGET AND ECONOMIC OUTLOOK: FISCAL YEARS

2005-2014 APP.F (2003), availableat http://www.cbo.gov/showdoc.cfm?index= 821 &sequence=0 (last
visited Feb. 4, 2004).
56. CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, THE BUDGET AND ECONOMIC OUTLOOK: AN UPDATE 1, 2

tbl.l (2003), available at http://www.cbo.gov/showdoc.cfm?index=4493&sequence=0 (last visited Jan.
31, 2004).
57. Id.
58. THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., supra note 2.
59. For a comparison of the prescription drug coverage portions of the two Medicare reform bills,
see THE

HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., A SIDE-BY-SIDE COMPARISON OF THE PRESCRIPTION

DRUG COVERAGE PROVISIONS OF S. I AND H.R. 1 (2003), available at http://www.kff.org/rxdrugs
/loader.cfm?url-/commonspot/security/getfile.cfm&PagelD=14390 (last visited Jan. 31, 2004).
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In early 2003, President Bush proposed a $400 billion plan over 10 years to
improve Medicare prescription drug coverage and expand the role of private
insurers in the program. 60 Republicans concluded that they could claim credit for a
prescription drug benefit and, since they control both the legislative and executive
branches of government, they would face negative consequences at the polls in
2004 if they failed to deliver on President Bush's pledge on this issue in the 2000
campaign. Sensing that bipartisan cooperation in the Senate limited the chances
for a Democratic filibuster, the President lobbied heavily and made major
concessions to win over skeptical allies and quickly enact legislation.
The Senate and House of Representatives passed different versions of a new
Medicare prescription drug benefit program in June 2003 and convened a
conference committee in an effort to get a bill for the President to sign by the end
of the year.61 Several months of protracted negotiation were required to address
opposition from those who felt the new prescription drug benefits were inadequate,
those who felt the overall Medicare program required more radical reform, and
those who wanted to leverage the Medicare bill for favored constituencies. In
November 2003, both houses of Congress narrowly approved the Medicare
Prescription Drug Improvement and Modernization Act with a host of new
benefits, subsidies, payment changes, and expansions of private plans.62 As one of
the president's leading domestic policy priorities, Medicare reform has consumed
both the financial resources and political capital needed to expand coverage to
those under age sixty-five.
The administration's key policies for expanding coverage to the uninsured
have primarily built on the status quo, providing states with greater flexibility but
little infusion of additional federal dollars. The three major areas of action include:
1) augmenting state flexibility in state Medicaid and SCHIP programs; 2)
providing tax credits for the purchase of health insurance by individuals with lowincomes; and 3) increasing funding for community health centers.

60. Press Release, The White House, Fact Sheet: President Bush's 2004 Budget (Feb. 3, 2003),
availableat http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/02/print/20030203-6.html (last visited Jan.
31,2004).
61. Lee, Philip R. et al., A History of Medicare and Prescription Drug Coverage: A Persistent
Issue in a Changing Political Climate 35-37 (June 2003) (unpublished report to the Kaiser Family
Foundation, on file with the Journal of Health Care Law & Policy); JOCELYN GUYER, THE HENRY J.
KAISER FAMILY FOUND., THE PROPOSED MEDICARE PRESCRIPTION DRUG BENEFIT: A DETAILED
REVIEW OF IMPLICATIONS FOR DUAL ELIGIBLES AND OTHER Low INCOME MEDICARE BENEFICIARIES

(Sept. 2003),
available at http://www.kff.org/medicaid/loader.cfm?url=/commonspot/security
/getfile.cfm&PagelD=21805 (last visited Jan. 31, 2004). There were two versions, the Senate Bill, S.1,
known as "Prescription Drug & Medicare Improvement Act of 2003" and the House Bill, H.R. 1,known
as "Medicare Prescription Drug & Modernization Act of 2003."
62. 2003 Legislative Summary: Medicare Prescription Drug Coverage, CONG. Q. WKLY 3121
(Dec. 13, 2003); Press Release, DHHS, Secretary Thompson Applauds Final Passage of Medicare Bill
(Nov. 25, 2003), availableat http://dhhs.gov/news/press/2003pres/20031125.html (last visited Jan. 31,
2004).
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In August 2001, the Bush Administration took section 1115 authority a step
further when Secretary Tommy G. Thompson announced the Health Insurance
Flexibility and Accountability Initiative (HIFA).63 Under HIFA, states were given
unprecedented flexibility to limit benefits and impose cost sharing on significant
portions of their Medicaid and SCHIP populations. In addition, states were given
the authority to use Medicaid savings from such limitations and excess SCHIP
funds to expand coverage to populations not traditionally covered under these
programs. 64 No new federal dollars would be provided unless states chose to
65
expand coverage to categorically eligible groups under the Medicaid program.
In January 2003, the Bush Administration announced a plan to modernize
Medicaid, which it described as giving states "the upfront investment and
flexibility to design health care programs that best meet the needs of their citizens
and expand coverage to more people, including the mentally ill, chronically ill,
those with HIV/AIDS, and those with substance abuse problems." 66 Little progress
has been made on this reform proposal. While the National Governors'
Association (NGA) initially applauded the proposed reforms, it has since raised
concerns with the Administration's desire to limit federal Medicaid spending in
exchange for additional state flexibility. 67 Critics of the plan cautioned that the
reforms would limit federal funding, potentially harming states and recipients in
the long run. Additionally, concerns were raised that reforms could have dire
consequences for the nursing home population supported by Medicaid funding, and
that they might further threaten fundamental protections traditionally guaranteed to
low-income populations.68 This debate reflects the classic tension between federal
and state authority over social programs - states want more federal funding with

63. Press Release, DHHS, HHS to Give States New Options for Expanding Health Coverage: New
Initiative Promotes State Innovations to Expand Access for the Uninsured (Aug. 4, 2001), availableat
http://dhhs.gov/news/press/2001pres/20010804.html (last visited Jan. 31, 2004).
64. See id.
65. See id.
66. Press Release, DHHS, Bush Administration Will Propose Innovative Improvements in States'
Health Coverage for Low-Income Americans (Jan. 31, 2003), available at http://dhhs.gov/news/press
/2003pres/2003013 ld.html (last visited Jan. 31, 2004).
67. Press Release, NGA, NGA Statement on HHS Medicaid Proposal (Jan. 31, 2003), availableat
http://www.nga.org/nga/newsRoom/l,l169,CPRESS_RELEASE^D_4978,00.html (last visited Jan.
31, 2004) (applauding the Bush Administration's proposed Medicaid reforms); NAT'L GOVERNORS'
ASS'N,

POLICY

POSITION DETAIL ON

HR-43: MEDICAID REFORM

PRINCIPLES,

available at

http://www.nga.org/nga/legislativeUpdate/1,1 169,C_POLICYPOSITIONAD 5113,00.html
(last
visited Jan. 31, 2004) (detailing new policy positions developed at winter meeting, including the
position that the federal government should pay for 100 percent of the cost of any new Medicaid
mandates).
68. CINDY MANN, INST. FOR HEALTH CARE RESEARCH & POLICY, THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION'S
MEDICAID AND STATE CHILDREN'S HEALTH INSURANCE PROGRAM PROPOSAL 4-7 (2003), availableat

http://www.georgetown.edu/research/ihcrp/pdfs/mannbushproposal.pdf (last visited Jan. 31, 2004).
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fewer strings attached, while the policy community voices concern that greater
flexibility at the state level may lead to a race to the bottom.
In February 2003, Secretary Thompson announced that the President's budget
proposal included $89 billion in new tax credits for individuals who purchase
health insurance coverage. 69 Eligible families with two or more children could
receive up to $3,000 in credits and eligible individuals would receive up to a
$1,000 tax credit. 70 While tax credits may result in new coverage for some of the
uninsured, Jonathan Gruber and Larry Levitt have argued that, because the credit
falls well short of the cost of insurance premiums, this strategy will principally
serve to provide subsidies to those that are already purchasing coverage in the nongroup market rather than extend coverage to the uninsured.7'
Finally, in March 2003, the Bush administration announced that it would
provide $16 million to community health centers in the United States to "help
provide care for many uninsured Americans and others who otherwise would have
had no place to turn to get help. . . Health centers play a critical role in this effort
by providing a safety net for patients, regardless of their ability to pay.",72 While
this only amounts to about four cents per uninsured person, the Bureau of Primary
Health Care, which administers the grants to federally qualified community health
centers, expects to use these funds to significantly increase the capacity of health
centers in the next five years.73 By the end of this period, health centers expect to
increase the number of uninsured that they care for from about four million to eight
million annually, still only a small fraction of the nation's uninsured.74

ASSESSING THE PROSPECTS FOR A STATE-BASED PATH TO UNIVERSAL COVERAGE

For the reasons outlined above, the single-payer strategy outlined by
Oberlander and Marmor is at best a long-term strategy, probably years or decades
in the making. Given the large and ever-growing number of uninsured Americans

69. Press Release, DHHS, Budget to Continue President's Initiatives for the Uninsured (Feb. 11,
2003), available at http://www.hhs.gov/news/press/2003pres/20030211.html (last visited Jan. 31,
2004).
70. Id.
71. Jonathan Gruber & Larry Levitt, Tax Subsidies for Health Insurance: Costs and Benefits, 19
HEALTH AFF. 72, 76-78 (2000).

72. Press Release, DHHS, HHS Awards $16 Million to 31 Health Centers to Expand Access to
Comprehensive Health Care Services for the Uninsured (Mar. 24, 2003), available at
http://www.dhhs.gov/news/press/2003pres/20030324.html (last visited Dec. 3, 2003).
73. Personal communication with Leiyu Shi, Johns Hopkins University, Bloomberg School of
Public Health, in Baltimore, MD, June 2003. For general information about community heath centers,
see THE BUREAU OF PRIMARY HEALTH

CARE,

PROGRAM

HISTORY,

at http://bphc.hrsa.gov

/programs/CHCPrograminfo.asp (last visited Feb. 4, 2004).
74. Personal communication, supra note 73; see also THE BUREAU OF PRIMARY HEALTH CARE, at
http://bphc.hrsa.gov/chc/CHCmain.asp (last visited Feb. 4, 2004).
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and the enormous personal and social costs of their plight, it is necessary to pursue
other strategies for expanding health coverage even if the single-payer strategy is
judged to produce the best long-term outcomes in terms of equity, efficiency and
personal security.
This leaves the federalist and pincer strategies as options to consider.
Thomas Oliver notes that, "[i]n the natural order of our political system, inaction at
the top begets action below." 75 In fact, a select number of states have already
demonstrated they are fully capable of tackling the complex and costly problems of
the uninsured. 76 These states enacted comprehensive health care system reforms in
the late 1980s and early 1990s, while Republican presidents and a Democraticallycontrolled Congress were gridlocked on the issue.
Even though few states adopted universal coverage initiatives, the vast
majority of states took a number of incremental steps to expand health insurance
coverage. Nearly every state undertook reforms to improve the affordability and
availability of insurance products for small groups.77 However, these reforms have
had limited success in expanding health insurance coverage for the uninsured and
in some cases these reforms have resulted in loss of insurance. 78 In addition,
many states expanded Medicaid coverage for children beyond the federal mandates
prior to the enactment of the State Children's Health Insurance Program (SCHIP),
and a number of states used section 1115 demonstration waiver authority to expand
coverage significantly to adult populations. 79 Finally, a number of states pursued
dollars to expand health
programs funded with general revenue or foundation
80
insurance coverage to higher-income children.

75. Thomas R. Oliver, Ideas, Entrepreneurship,and the Politics of Health Care Reform, 3 STAN.
L. & POL'Y REV. 160, 160 (1991).

76. See infra notes 144-56 and accompanying text.
77. See Thomas R. Oliver, The Dilemmas of Incrementalism: Logical and Policy Constraints in
the Design of Health Insurance Reforms, 18 J. POL'Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 652, 665-674 (1999); see

also Christopher Stream, Health Reform in the States: A Model of State Small Group Health Insurance
Market Reforms, 52 POL. RES. Q. 499, 499 (1999).
78. See Stephen Long & Susan Marquis, Have Small-Group Health Insurance Purchasing

Alliances Increased Coverage? 20 HEALTH AFF. 154, 160-62 (2001); see also Len M. Nichols, State
Regulation: What Have We Learned So Far? 25 J. HEALTH POL., POL'Y & L. 175 (2000); Linda J.

Blumberg & Len M. Nichols, First, Do No Harm: Developing Health Insurance Market Reform
Packages, 15 HEALTH AFF. 35 (1996) (offering evaluations and case studies of several states' efforts to
regulate insurance for small groups); Stephen Zuckerman & Shruti Rajan, An Alternative Approach to
Measuringthe Effects of Insurance Market Reforms, 36 INQUIRY 44 (1999) (finding that small group
reforms have had little effect on health insurance coverage, but that individual market reforms have
resulted in increased rates of uninsurance and have reduced private coverage).
79. Lawrence D. Brown & Michael S. Sparer, Window Shopping: State Health Reform Policy in
the 1990s, 20 HEALTH AFF. 50, 56 (2001); John Holahan & Mary Beth Pohl, States as Innovators in
Low-Income Health Coverage, in ASSESSING THE NEW FEDERALISM DISCUSSION PAPERS 02-08, June

2002, at 33-34, available at http://www.urban.org/url.cfm?ID=310519 (last visited Jan. 31, 2004).
80. Brown & Sparer, supra note 79, at 56.
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In recent years, state governments have greatly enhanced their policy
expertise, which has fueled their ability to develop innovative policy activities and
has prompted an increased demand for devolution of authority from the federal
government. Prior to the mid 1960s, state governance was unsophisticated and
decision making was spread out over numerous agencies and positions with little
centralized accountability. 81 Supreme Court decisions in 1965 required that states
make changes to their constitutions and the composition of their legislatures to
comply with the one person, one vote principle, which in turn facilitated additional
broad-based change in many states to clarify the roles of the executive, judicial and
administrative branches. 82 The two decades following these systemic state-level
overhauls were a period of growth in the authority and sophistication of governors,
evolution of more professional legislative bodies that met more often, and the
hiring and retaining of highly trained staff in all branches of government,
particularly in administrative agencies.83 The growing sophistication of state
governments ultimately led to better information and capacity for planning and
program design,84 and increased the likelihood of more successful outcomes when
policy initiatives-large or small-were undertaken.
The critical role of states under the federalist and pincer scenarios naturally
leads us to question whether states can handle the responsibility of taking the lead
on universal coverage. The answer is a heavily qualified yes. While most states
have the interest and expertise to develop new health insurance initiatives, only a
few will have the resources and leadership to solve a problem of such magnitude.
Without considerable federal financial support, rapid progress toward universal
coverage is unlikely. The following sections explore how past initiatives highlight
both the promise and limits of state action on the path to universal coverage.

THE LIMITS OF THE FEDERALIST STRATEGY: LESSONS FROM THE EARLY
INNOVATORS

State adoption of new and innovative programs often leads observers to claim
that states can serve as the "laboratories of democracy," developing solutions that

81. CAROL S. WEISSERT & WILLIAM G. WEISSERT, GOVERNING HEALTH: THE POLITICS OF
HEALTH POLICY 192-241 (2d ed. 2002).

82. Frank J. Thompson, Federalism and Health Care Policy: Toward Redefinition? in THE NEW
POLITICS OF STATE HEALTH POLICY 41-70 (Robert B. Hackey & David A. Rochefort eds., 2001). See
also WEISSERT & WEISSERT, supra note 81, at 192-94.

83. WEISSERT & WEISSERT, supra note 81, at 192-94.
84. See Thomas R. Oliver & Pamela Paul-Shaheen, Translating Ideas into Actions:
EntrepreneurialLeadership in State Health Care Reforms, 22 J. HEALTH POL., POL'Y & L. 721, 742-88
(1 9 9 7); See generally Thompson, supra note 82; WEISSERT & WEISSERT, supra note 81, at 192-94.
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85
other states and the federal government can adopt to address common problems.
The viability of the federalist strategy, in particular, rests on the assumption that a
sufficient number of states have the capacity to formulate complex public policies,
as well as the fiscal capacity and political will to set an irreversible course toward
universal coverage. It also assumes that the state political process will not fall
victim to the limitations of disjointed incrementalism that is often present in the
political process at the federal level.
As noted above, few states have succeeded in enacting innovative programs
that attempted comprehensive reform of their health care system, including an
effort to achieve or nearly achieve universal insurance coverage. Even fewer,
moreover, have managed to sustain their efforts over time. In light of these efforts,
it is somewhat doubtful that a federalist strategy for universal coverage will
succeed across all fifty states. The following sections summarize the research of
Thomas Oliver and Pamela Paul-Shaheen, who analyzed the experiences of
Massachusetts, Oregon, Florida, Minnesota, Vermont, and Washington State, the
six states identified as early innovators due to their efforts to enact comprehensive
reforms in the late 1980s and early 1990s.

States are Typically Not Laboratories
Based on their research, Oliver and Paul-Shaheen refute the common
characterization of states as "laboratories of democracy., 86 They disagree with the
use of the "laboratory" metaphor, explaining that the state innovations are not
subject to rigorous evaluation or testing. Innovations are seldom adopted in a
wholesale fashion, rather policy development tends to be piecemeal and
accomplished through a long process of trial and error; and the models adopted
often reflect institutional legacies or local priorities rather than scientific
88

knowledge.

Oliver and Paul-Shaheen demonstrate instead that states tend to take very
different approaches from one another based more on internal politics, leadership
and existing programs. 89 They argue that rather than thinking of states as
laboratories, "it is more accurate to think of states as specialized political markets,
or niches in the national political market, in which individuals and groups can
develop and promote an array of policy innovations." 90

85.
at 52.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.

WEISSERT & WEISSERT, supra note 81, at 226-236. See also Brown & Sparer, supra note 79,

See Oliver & Paul-Shaheen, supra note 84, at 723-24.
Oliver & Paul-Shaheen, supra note 84, at 723-24.
Oliver & Paul-Shaheen, supra note 84, at 723-24.
Oliver & Paul-Shaheen, supra note 84, at 723-24.
Oliver & Paul-Shaheen, supra note 84, at 724.
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Common State Characteristics
Oliver and Paul-Shaheen identified several common traits of states that were
successful in pursuing comprehensive reform. These factors included: 1) relative
economic wealth; 2) a political culture that allowed consideration of redistributive
policies; 3) Democrats taking the initiative; 4) committed, high-level leadership
(governors and key legislators); 5) commissions or other ad hoc arenas created to
study health care issues and formulate technically sophisticated proposals; 6) a "try
and try again" philosophy-comprehensive reforms built upon earlier incremental
reforms and some defeats; and 7) a persuasive argument for reform based on social
91
justice, even during difficult economic times.

Importanceof Policy Entrepreneurs
According to Oliver and Paul-Shaheen, the key factor that enabled a few
states to successfully enact plans for universal coverage was strong and skilled
leadership from senior politicians- "policy entrepreneurs" and "investors," who
were able to negotiate the design and implementation of an innovative model.92 In
these states, the leadership came from the governor or key members of the state
legislature. 93 Legislators often had specific ideas and had the technical skills to
understand different options on the table, but ultimately became more concerned
with "piecing together a set of tangible and politically viable reforms than with
94
engineering an intellectually coherent product."
As the issue of health insurance coverage rises on the national agenda in
2003, the same general pattern holds. In June 2003, Maine adopted a plan that is
intended to establish universal coverage by 2009. The plan was a major feature of
Governor John Baldacci's election campaign in 2002. It will expand the state's
Medicaid program and provide sliding scale premiums to the self-employed and
95
workers in firms that do not offer coverage.
In October 2003, the California Legislature enacted the Health Insurance Plan
of 2003 (Senate Bill 2), which requires firms with over 200 employees to provide
health insurance to workers and their dependents as of 2006, or pay a fee to a state

91. Oliver & Paul-Shaheen, supra note 84, at 737-42.

92. Oliver & Paul-Shaheen, supra note 84, at 724. See also WEISSERT & WEISSERT, supra note
81, at 218.
93. Oliver & Paul-Shaheen, supra note 84, at 745.
94. Oliver & Paul-Shaheen, supra note 84, at 746.
95. Maine
Passes
Nation's
First
Universal Health
Plan,
available
at
http://covertheuninsuredweek.org/news/index.php?NewsID=338 (last visited Jan. 22, 2004).
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As of 2007, firms with 50 or more
fund to help cover the costs of coverage.
employees must provide coverage for their workers (but not their dependents) or
pay the state fee.97 If the state establishes subsidies, firms with 20 or more
employees will also be subject to the "pay or play" mandate in 2007.98 The plan
was spearheaded by Senate President Pro Tem John Burton (D) and by a highly
unusual alliance between the California Medical Association and California
Federation of Labor. 99 It was signed by Governor Gray Davis (D) two days before
voters elected to recall him. Preliminary estimates are that up to 1.5 million
uninsured Californians will receive coverage under the plan, if it is successfully
00°
implemented under the new Republican governor, Arnold Schwartzenegger.
The presence of skilled leaders does not always guarantee successful
implementation, but Oliver and Paul-Shaheen found that state-level policy
entrepreneurs have advantages over their counterparts at the federal level because
they are still close to the action.10' These advantages include a close working
relationship with officials from administrative agencies; their willingness to be
educators about the history and intent of the policy; involvement in the feedback
legislators
loop to correct implementation problems; and finally the shift of 1some
02
into administrative roles once their time as a legislator is complete.

The DisproportionateBurden of Uninsurance
Analysis of the early innovators suggests that the federalist strategy is limited
by the fact that only a relatively few number of states at any given time have the
right combination of economic and political conditions to take on the redistributive
politics of universal health insurance. The viability of the federalist strategy is also
heavily dependent on where the uninsured reside. As shown in Table 1, close to
half of the uninsured, 46.4 percent, reside in just five states--California, Texas,
New York, Florida, and Illinois-which represent 36.5 percent of the nation's

96. Lisa Rapaport, Davis Approves Health Care Bill, SACRAMENTO BEE, Oct. 6, 2003; Press
Release, Office of the Governor, Governor Davis Signs Historic Health Care Legislation for Working
Californians (Oct. 5, 2003) (on file with the Journal of Health Care Law & Policy) [hereinafter
Governor Davis Signs Historic Legislation].
97. Governor Davis Signs Historic Legislation, supra note 96.
98. Governor Davis Signs Historic Legislation, supra note 96.
99. Governor Davis Signs Historic Legislation, supra note 96.
100. Lisa Rapaport, supra note 96; see also Carl Ingram, Governor Expected to Sign Health Bill;
Measure Would Require More Employers to Provide Insurance, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 1, 2003 at BI,
available at 2003 WL 2438357. Under the provisions of SB 2, employees who have worked for an
employer for three months and work at least 100 hours per month are eligible. CALIFORNIA
HEALTHCARE FOUNDATION, HEALTH INSURANCE ACT OF 2003 (SB2), at http://www.chcf.org
/sb2/index.cfm (last visited Feb. 4, 2004).
101. Oliver & Paul-Shaheen, supra note 84, at 745.
102. Oliver & Paul-Shaheen, supra note 84, at 742-46.
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population.10 3 All but Illinois have uninsurance rates that are higher than the
national average of 14.6 percent. 1°4 For the federalist strategy to trigger universal
coverage for the nation, some of these critical states would almost certainly have to
take the lead to establish the momentum needed for the rest to follow. The extent
of the challenge is illustrated by the fact that under California's major new plan,
four to five million state residents would remain uninsured even if the legislation
survives political and legal attacks during its implementation.
TABLE 1
Distribution of the Uninsured in Selected States, 2000
Uninsured in State Population in State as a
State
Uninsurance Rate
as a Share of Total Share of Total U.S.
in State
Population
Uninsured in U.S.
12.2%
16.3%
19.5%
California
7.5%
12.0%
23.5%
Texas
6.7%
7.1%
15.5%
New York
5.8%
6.9%
17.5%
Florida
4.4%
4.1%
13.6%
Illinois
36.5%
46.4%
Total
Source: U.S. Census Bureau, Current Population Survey, 2001 Annual
Demographic Supplement.

The FadingERISA Barrier
Another potential barrier to the federalist strategy is the Employee Retirement
and Income Security Act (ERISA), which was enacted by Congress in 1974 to
prevent pension fraud. 105 ERISA is widely perceived to be an important barrier to
state health care innovation, particularly efforts such as the one in California to
expand employer-sponsored health coverage. 106 Of particular concern is the fact

103. Authors' calculations are based on data from the BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS & BUREAU OF
THE CENSUS, ANNUAL DEMOGRAPHIC SURVEY MARCH 2002 SUPPLEMENT, CURRENT POPULATION
SURVEY. Estimates reflect uninsurance for the entire year and include elderly populations in both the
numerator and denominator.
104. Id.
105. Employee Retirement and Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001- 1461 (2000).
106. See, e.g., Mary Ann Chirba-Martin & Troyen A. Brennan, The CriticalRole of ERISA in State
Health Reform, 13 HEALTH AFF. 142 (1994) (evaluating the preventative effect of ERISA on states
ability to reform health insurance); PATRICIA A. BUTLER, NAT'L ACAD. FOR STATE HEALTH POL'Y,
REVISITING PAY OR PLAY: How STATES COULD EXPAND EMPLOYER-BASED COVERAGE WITHIN

ERISA CONSTRAINTS (2002), available at http://www.nashp.org/Files/ERISApayorplay.PDF (last
visited Jan. 31, 2004).
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that ERISA preempts state laws that "relate to" employee benefit plans, including
health plans. 10 7 While ERISA does allow states to regulate insurance, employers'
self-insured plans cannot be deemed to be insurance under ERISA,
thus
08
preempting such self-insured plans from state health insurance regulation.,
It is widely accepted that state mandates, requiring that employers provide
insurance to their employees are preempted by ERISA under the authority of
Standard Oil v. Agsalud.10 9 Therefore, ERISA preemption eliminates state
mandates as a possibility for states interested in expanding coverage. What
appears to be untested, however, is whether "pay or play" initiatives under which a
state would tax employers in order to finance a state-sponsored insurance program,
or pool and give tax credits to employers who provide insurance coverage to their
employees, would be preempted by ERISA." l0 This is a key issue now being
advanced to challenge the new California law. Another version of such a plan is
currently being considered in Maryland."'
According to Patricia Butler, such
initiatives are likely to withstand an ERISA challenge so long as the state
maintains no preference as to whether employers offer the coverage or pay the tax,
and if the legislation does not require a minimum benefit package in order to
receive a tax credit."' 2 If this is the case, "pay-or-play" initiatives may provide an
3
untapped opportunity to finance state insurance pools for the uninsured."
Both employer-mandates and "pay-or-play" options provide benefits to
states beyond their ability to finance insurance coverage. In particular, the use of
these mechanisms allows states to require some sort of effort on the part of
employers and individuals.
Specifically, strategies such as "pay-or-play"
initiatives or targeted employer mandates can be designed to help assure that
current private expenditures on health insurance remain in the system. While these

107. See Chirba-Martin & Brennen, supra note 106, at 144-45. The preemption provision has three
sections. First, ERISA preempts state laws that "relate to" an ERISA qualified plan. Second, state laws

that regulate insurance are "saved" from preemption. Third, state laws may not regulate ERISA plans
that are self-insured. The first and third sections have been read broadly, maximizing the provision's
preemptive effect. Margaret G. Farrell, ERISA Preemption and Regulation of Managed Health Care:

The Casefor ManagedFederalism, 23 AM. J. L. & MED. 251, 261 (1997).
108. Chirba-Martin & Brennan, supranote 106 at 145-46; BUTLER, supra note 106, at 2.
109. 633 F.2d 760, 764 (9th Cir. 1980); see also Chirba-Martin & Brennan, supra note 106, at 14750 (discussing a number of court cases continuing to illustrate the effect of ERISA preemption on state
attempts to reform health care financing). One state, Hawaii has an employer mandate. This mandate
was enacted in 1974, prior to ERISA, and is thus exempt from its provisions. Congress amended
section 514(b) of ERISA in response to Agsalud by explicitly exempting Hawaii's Prepaid Health Care
Act from ERISA preemption. See Act of Jan. 14, 1983, Pub. L. No. 97-473, § 30 1(a), 96 Sta. 2605,
2611-12 (codified at 29 U.S.C. §1 144(b)(5) (1988)).
110. See BUTLER, supra note 106, at 5-8.
111. MARYLAND CITIZENS' HEALTH INITIATIVE, A PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIP FOR HEALTH
CARE FOR ALL MARYLANDERS: COST AND COVERAGE IMPACTS ANALYSIS (Oct. 28, 2003), at

http://www.healthcareforall.com (last visited Feb. 4, 2004).
112. BUTLER, supra note 106, at 7-8.
113. BUTLER, supra note 106, at 7-8.
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mechanisms will likely generate considerable political opposition from the
business community, assuring that public expenditures on health insurance
coverage do not substitute for private expenditures may be necessary in order to
achieve the political capital needed if universal coverage is to be enacted.

OtherExternal Constraints
Even if states have favorable internal conditions, they often face severe
external constraints on their efforts to expand health insurance. Before reforms can
be fully implemented, states are vulnerable to shifts in broad public support,
changes in leadership and key supporters, and economic uncertainty and fiscal
stress. 114 This proved to be the case when, in the wake of the disastrous fallout
from the failed Clinton plan, nearly all of the states with plans for universal
1 5
coverage drastically scaled back their initiatives.

LIMITS OF THE PINCER STRATEGY: THE HIGH WATER MARK IS STILL A

Low

TIDE

The pincer strategy-using the existing Medicaid, SCHIP, and Medicare
programs to achieve universal coverage-shares many common characteristics and
limitations with the federalist strategy. While both strategies require a partnership
between the federal and state governments, the pincer strategy provides less
programmatic flexibility at the state level. In the following sections, we describe
the mechanisms available to states to expand insurance coverage to new
populations under the Medicaid and SCHIP programs. We also document state
efforts to date to use these mechanisms to expand coverage in an era that saw
increased flexibility afforded to states, a major financial commitment at the federal
level, and the largest economic boom in recent history. We conclude that a statebased pincer strategy without significant federal funding is unlikely to achieve
dramatic expansions toward universal coverage in many states.

Strategiesfor Covering Children,Pregnant Women, Parents and Childless Adults
Children and Pregnant Women. Until the mid 1980s, Medicaid coverage
of children and pregnant women was limited to those living in families that
received Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC). Beginning with the

114. See Oliver & Paul-Shaheen, supra note 84, at 782.
115. Oliver & Paul-Shaheen, supra note 84, at 782.
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Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act (OBRA) of 1986,' 16 a series of federal
legislation gave states the option to cover certain low-income children and
17
pregnant women who were either ineligible for or not participating in AFDC.'
The Medicare Catastrophic Coverage Act (MCCA) of 198818 began another series
of legislation that ended with OBRA 1990'19 which mandated that states expand
eligibility for certain children incrementally. 120 Under these mandates, broadly
referred to as the poverty-related expansions, states were required to cover children
under age six and pregnant women in families with incomes up to 133 percent of
the federal poverty level (FPL), and children born after September 30, 1983 in
families with incomes up to 100 percent of the FPL.121 As a result of this
legislation, all states were required to cover children under age nineteen in families
with incomes under the poverty level by October 1, 2002.122 States were allowed
to phase in the expansions in coverage at a faster rate than mandated, and were also
given the flexibility to cover children at higher income levels than mandated by
disregarding a portion of the families' income using methodologies outlined in
section 1902(r)(2) of the Social Security Act, enacted in 1988, and amended in

116. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-509, § 9401, 100 Stat. 1874,
2050 (1986) (current version codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
117. See e.g., Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-203, 101 Stat. 1330159 (1987) (allowed states to cover pregnant women and young children up to age 5 in families with
incomes at or below 100 percent of the federal poverty level); Family Support Act of 1988, Pub. L. No.
100-485, 102 Stat. 2343 (1988) (required states to extend Medicaid coverage for twelve months to
families leaving AFDC rolls due to earnings from work, and required states to cover two-parent
unemployed families meeting state AFDC income and resource standards); Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-239, 103 Stat. 2273 (1989) (required states to cover
pregnant women and children under age 6 in families with incomes at or below 133 percent of federal
poverty level). See infra, note 121, for an explanation of the federal poverty level.
118. Medicare Catastrophic Coverage Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-360, §§ 301, 302, 102 Stat. 683
(1988).
119. Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 97-473, § 301(a), 96 Stat. 2605, 2611-12
(codified at 29 U.S.C. § I I44(b)(5)(1988)).
120. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No.101-508, § 4601, 104 Stat. 1388,
1388-166 (1990) (current version codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1396a (2000)).
121. Families and unrelated individuals are classified as being above or below the poverty level
using the poverty index originated at the Social Security Administration in 1964 and revised by Federal
Interagency Committees in 1969 and 1980. The poverty index is based solely on money income and
does not reflect the fact that many low-income persons receive non-cash benefits such as food stamps,
Medicaid, public housing, etc. Whether the income of a family or household is above or below the
poverty level depends on income and the number of persons in the household. The poverty thresholds
are updated every year to reflect changes in the Consumer Price Index. An individual or a family is said
to be at 100% of the federal poverty level if their total income is equal to or less than the current federal
poverty level.
122. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No.101-508, § 4601, 104 Stat. 1388,
1388-166 (1990) (current version codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1396a (2000)).
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subsequent years. 123 The section 1902(r)(2) methodologies essentially allowed
states to cover children at virtually any income level under the Medicaid
program. 124 As of June 1997, thirty-two states had expanded coverage for infants
and children above the federal mandates and eight had25 expanded coverage for
infants and pregnant women above the federal mandates.1
SCHIP, created in 1997, provided states with a vehicle to expand
eligibility for children beyond their current Medicaid levels and receive a higher
federal match than under the Medicaid program. All states took advantage of this
opportunity. By SCHIP's five year anniversary, twenty-six states and the District
of Columbia were covering children with incomes up to 200 percent of the FPL,
thirteen states had set eligibility thresholds higher than 200 percent of the FPL, and
only eleven had eligibility thresholds lower than 200 percent of the FPL. 26 As a
consequence, all but 16 percent of low-income127uninsured children are now eligible
for coverage under either Medicaid or SCHIP.
Parents. States' authority to cover parents under the Medicaid program has
lagged far behind their authority to expand coverage for children. Coverage of
non-elderly adults under Medicaid has historically been limited to parents
receiving cash assistance under Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC),
disabled adults receiving Supplemental Security Income (SSI), and, since the mid1980s, pregnant women. 128 Many poor and near-poor parents were ineligible for
Medicaid because AFDC eligibility was restricted to very low-income, singleparent families and two-parent families where either one parent was incapacitated
or the principal wage earner was unemployed. 21'9

123. See JOCELYN GUYER & CINDY MANN, CTR. ON BUDGET POL'Y &

PRIORITIES, TAKING THE

NEXT STEP: STATES CAN Now TAKE ADVANTAGE OF FEDERAL MEDICAID MATCHING FUNDS TO

EXPAND HEALTH CARE COVERAGE TO LOW-INCOME WORKING PARENTS 19-21 (1998).

124. Brian K. Bruen & Frank Ullman, Children's Health Insurance Programs: Where States Are,
Where they Are Headed, in ASSESSING THE NEW FEDERALISM: ISSUES AND OPTIONS FOR STATES 1

(Urb. Inst., Series A, No. A-20, Wash., D.C.), May 1988. Pregnant women and qualified Medicare
beneficiaries with higher incomes can also be made eligible for Medicaid under these provisions.
125. See id.
126. Lisa Dubay et al., Five Things Everyone Should Know About SCHIP, in ASSESSING THE NEW
FEDERALISM: ISSUES AND OPTIONS FOR STATES 2 (Urb. Inst., Series A, No. A-55, Wash., D.C.), Oct.
2002.
127. Lisa Dubay et al., Children's Eligibility for Medicaid and SCHIP: National and State
Estimates, in ASSESSING THE NEW FEDERALISM: ISSUES AND OPTIONS FOR STATES 3 (Urb. Inst., Series

B, No. B-41, Wash., D.C.), Mar. 2002.
128. Lisa Dubay et al., Extending Medicaid to Parents:An Incremental Strategy for Reducing the
Number of Uninsured, in ASSESSING THE NEW FEDERALISM: NATIONAL SURVEY OF AMERICAN

FAMILIES 2 (Urb. Inst., Series B, No. B-20, Wash., D.C.), Mar. 2002.
129. Id. In order to be considered unemployed, the principal wage eamer must have worked fewer
than 100 hours a month and have had a history of work-force participation, further restricting coverage.
Id. at 6 n.2.
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Five federal changes--one legislative, the others administrativedramatically expanded the options available to states for covering low-income
parents under Medicaid and/or SCHIP. 130 First, after being elected President in
1992, Bill Clinton significantly enhanced state opportunities to use Medicaid to
expand coverage to parents and other populations not traditionally eligible under
Medicaid using section 1115 demonstration waiver authority.' 3' It is under section
1115 authority that Oregon, Tennessee, and Hawaii expanded Medicaid eligibility
for children and adults, and Rhode Island expanded Medicaid eligibility for
132
children and pregnant women in the early to mid-1990s.

Second, the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation
Act of 1996 (PRWORA) created a new category of Medicaid eligibility in section
1931 of the Social Security Act, which expanded state options for covering
parents. 133 It required states to grant such eligibility to those adults and children
who would have been entitled to AFDC under the income and resource standards
in effect on July 16, 1996.134 It also gave states the option to use less restrictive
methodologies for counting income and resources when determining eligibilitythus allowing states to make higher income families that meet the categorical
135
requirements under the old AFDC program - eligible for Medicaid.
Third, DHHS issued a regulation in August 1998 that permitted states to use
less restrictive rules to define unemployment for two-parent families, essentially
allowing states to cover all two-parent families that meet the section 1931 income

130. For a more complete discussion of this issue, see GUYER & MANN, supra note 123; Dubay et
al., supra note 128.
131. Clarke Cagey, Health Reform, Year Seven: Observations About Medicaid Managed Care, 22
HEALTH CARE FINANCING REV., Fall 2000, at 127.

132. See Press Release, Leighton Ku & Matthew Broaddus, Center on Budget & Policy Priorities,
The Importance of Family-Based Insurance Expansions: New Research Findings about State Health
Reforms (Sept. 5, 2000), available at http://www.cbpp.org/9-5-00health-rep.pdf (last visited Jan. 31,
2004) (noting that Oregon, Tennessee, and Hawaii expanded Medicaid eligibility for children and
adults); NATIONAL GOVERNOR'S ASSOCIATION, MCH UPDATE: STATE MEDICAID COVERAGE OF
PREGNANT WOMEN AND CHILDREN 3 (Sept. 30, 1997), available at http://www.nga.org/cda/files

/MCHUPDATE0997.pdf (last visited Jan. 31, 2004) (noting Rhode Island's expansion of Medicaid
eligibility for children and pregnant women).
133. Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, § 114, 42 U.S.C. §
1396u-l (2000); See also Dubay et al., supra note 128, at 2 (analyzing the various provisions of the
PRWORA).
134. Dubay et al., supra note 128 at 2. States also have the option to use a lower resource standard
for determining eligibility under Section 1931, but these standards cannot go below those in effect on
May 1, 1998. States can also adjust their income and resource standards upward in accordance with the
consumer price index. Dubay et al., supra note 128 at 2.
135. Dubay et al., supra note 128 at 2. "In essence, the latter provision allows states to disregard
income and resources, effectively making certain families eligible for Medicaid at higher incomes than
under old AFDC rules. This provision is similar to § 1902(r)(2) provisions that allowed states to cover
children and pregnant women with incomes above the mandated and optional levels." Dubay et al.,
supra note 128 at 6 n.6.
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and resource requirements. 3 6 Importantly, section 1931 eligibility provisions apply
only to families, making it impossible for parents to be made eligible without their
children.' 37
Fourth, in July 2000 the Clinton Administration opened the door for states
to use section 1115 authority in SCHIP to expand coverage to parents of SCHIPexcess SCHIP funding. 38 Four states took advantage of
eligible children using
139
this initial offering.
And fifth, as mentioned earlier, the Bush Administration further stretched the
use of section 1115 authority in August 2001 under HIFA by providing states with
broad authority to expand to new populations, including parents. 140 To date, five
states-Arizona, California, Illinois, New Mexico, and Oregon-have authority
under HIFA to expand coverage to parents, but not all have implemented the
planned expansions. 141
Childless Adults. Coverage of childless adults under Medicaid has
historically been limited to disabled and elderly individuals, and in certain
circumstances, such coverage extends to patients with acquired immune deficiency
syndrome (AIDS) or those covered by the more recent breast and cervical cancer
treatment programs.142 However, under both the Clinton and Bush Administration,
states have had the option to use section 1115 demonstration authority to cover
childless adults of any age provided sufficient state funding is available.

136. 45 C.F.R § 233.100-1 (2001). "Specifically, states can now eliminate the 100-hour rule,
effectively making all two-parent families that meet the income and resource standards under the
Section 1931 provisions eligible for Medicaid." Dubay et al., supra note 128 at 6 n.7.
137. Dubay et al., supra note 128, at 2.
138. Letter from Timothy Westmoreland, Director, Center for Medicaid & State Operations,
Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, to State Health Official (July 31, 2000), available at
http://www.cms.hhs.gov/schip/sho-letters/ch73 I 00.asp (last visited Jan. 31, 2004) (providing guidance
on proposed demonstration projects under the authority of section 1115 in the SCHIP program).
139. Embry Howell, et al., Early Experience with Covering Uninsured Parents Under SCHIP, in
ASSESSING THE NEW FEDERALISM: ISSUES AND OPTIONS FOR STATES 2 (Urb. Inst., Series A, No. A-51,
Wash., D.C.), May 2002. Since then, Arizona and California have obtained waivers to cover parents,
and Utah has obtained a waiver to cover only primary care for adults. Id.
140. See supra notes 63-65 and accompanying text (discussing the Bush Administration's use of
Section 1115 waiver authority under HIFA to help states expand coverage).
141. CTRS.

FOR

MEDICARE

&

MEDICAID

SERVS.,

SCHIP

APPROVED

SECTION

1115

DEMONSTRATION PROJECTS, available at http://www.cms.gov/schip/l 11 5waiv.pdf (last updated July
25, 2003).
142. See Sara Rosenbaum, Health Policy Report: Medicaid, 346 NEW ENG. J. MED., 635, 636-38
(2002); see generally Cindy Mann, The Flexibility Factor:Finding the Right Balance, 22 HEALTH AFF.
62, 65-67 (2003) (also discussing Medicaid eligibility and covered populations); Alan Weil, There's
Something About Medicaid, 22 HEALTH AFF. 13, 16, 20-22 (2003) (discussing Medicaid eligibility and
various populations the program covers).
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Progress To-Date Toward Universal Coverage
Table 2 outlines the steps that states have taken in expanding coverage using
both state and federal program dollars. As can be seen, Minnesota and Washington
cover all children and adults with family incomes up to 150 percent of the FPL.
Both of these states initially expanded coverage by creating state funded programs.
As federal flexibility increased and federal matching funds became available to
cover more populations, both states ultimately elected to use a combination of
Medicaid and SCHIP waivers to cover children and parents and state-only funds to
cover childless adults.
TABLE 2141
Expansions of Eligibility for Public Health Insurance Programs
Coverage of all adults and children to 150% of FPL

MN, WA

Coverage of all adults and children to 100% of FPL

AZ*, DE, HI, MA, NJ, NY, OR, TN, VT

Coverage of parents and children to 150% of FPL

CA*, CT, ME, RI, UT**, WI

Coverage of children above 200% FPL

GA, MD, MO, NH, NM, PA

* These states have received federal approval, but have not implemented all of the
planned expansions.
* *Utah covers primary care services only for childless adults up to 150% of FPL.
Nine states-Arizona, Delaware, Hawaii, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New
York, Oregon, Tennessee, and Vermont-cover all children and adults up to 100
percent of the FPL. 144 With the exception of Oregon, these states also cover
children with family incomes at or above 200 percent of the FPL and generally
cover parents up to 150 percent of the FPL. 14 5 Interestingly, by the early 1990s
four of these states-Hawaii, Massachusetts, Oregon, and Tennessee-had enacted
146
or implemented plans for universal or near-universal health insurance coverage.

143. Holahan & Pohl, supra note 79, at 33-34, as updated by data from CMS, including for SCHIP.
See http://www.cms.gov/schip/enrollment/fy02sqer.pdf (last visited Feb. 4, 2004); CTRS. FOR
MEDICARE

&

MEDICAID

SERVS.,

STATE

WAIVER

PROGRAMS

AND

DEMONSTRATIONS,

at

www.cms.gov/medicaid/waivers/waivermap.asp (last visited Feb. 4, 2004).
144. See tbl.2
145. Id.
146. BUREAU OF TENNCARE, WHAT IS TENNCARE, at http://www.state.tn.us/tenncare/whatis.html

(last visited Feb. 4, 2004); Oliver & Paul-Shaheen, supra note 84, at 725-29 (outlining the plans for
universal coverage developed by Massachusetts, Oregon, and Vermont).
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Ultimately, Massachusetts and Oregon were not able to obtain legislative or
administrative approval to implement the employer mandates that were integral
components of the states' universal coverage strategy, and instead developed
innovative programs that included broad expansions to both children and adults
using Section 1115 authority and state funds. 14 7 Hawaii and Tennessee scaled back
eligibility dramatically in the mid 1990s as enrollment growth and program costs
rapidly outgrew expectations. 148 Finally, in addition to the expansions mentioned
above, six states have authority to cover parents and children up to 150 percent of
the FPL or more: Califomia, Connecticut, Maine, Rhode Island, Utah and
Wisconsin. 149 Six more states cover children with family incomes above 200
150
percent of the FPL.
The SCHIP program also provides important evidence about the ability of
states to implement universal coverage. Two years after the Balanced Budget Act
of 1997 was passed, all states had implemented a SCHIP program. 51' States took a
variety of approaches to implementing SCHIP; thirty-five states developed
separate child health programs and sixteen expanded Medicaid., 52 Twenty-six
states and the District of Columbia expanded eligibility by covering children with
incomes up to 200 percent of the FPL, thirteen states set eligibility thresholds
higher than 200 percent of the FPL, and only eleven had eligibility thresholds
lower than 200 percent of the FPL.153 As a result of these expansions in eligibility,
about half of all children and 90 percent of all low-income children are estimated
to be income eligible for Medicaid or SCHIP. 154 More importantly, only 23
percent of all uninsured children and 16 percent of low-income uninsured children
are ineligible for one of these programs.' 55 This offers tremendous potential to
solve the problem of uninsured children and leaves only two to four percent of all
156
children uninsured and ineligible for coverage.

147. Oliver & Paul-Shaheen, supra note 84, at 725-29.
148. See STATE OF TENNESSEE, TENNCARE PROGRAM DESIGN AND WAIVER MODIFICATIONS, at

www.cms.hhs.gov/medicaid/1 I 15/tnwaiverfebl Ifnl.pdf (last visited Feb. 4, 2004); HAWAII'S SECTION
115 DEMONSTRATION FACT SHEET, at www.cms.hhs.gov/medicaid/1 115/hil Il5fs.pdf (last visited Feb.
4, 2004).
149. See tbl.2.
150. See tbl.2. The six states covering children with family income above 200% FPL are Georgia,
Maryland, Missouri, New Hampshire, New Mexico, and Pennsylvania.
151. Dubay et al., supranote 126, at 8 n.l.
152. Dubay et al., supranote 126, at 2.
153. Dubay et al., supranote 126, at 2.
154. Dubay et al., supranote 127, at 5.
155. Dubay et al., supranote 126, at 2-3.
156. Dubay et al., supra note 126, at 3. Estimates based on a detailed Medicaid and SCHIP

eligibility simulations model that uses the July 2001 eligibility rules to estimate eligibility on the 1999
National Survey of America's Families (NSAF). Dubay et al., supra note 126, at 3.
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In fact, increasing participation among eligible children would provide nearuniversal coverage of children in this country. Based on data from the 1999
National Survey of America's Families (NSAF), uninsurance rates for children
varied dramatically across the thirteen states studied in depth under the Urban
157
Institute's Assessing the New Federalism project.
Figure 1:
Increasing Participation is Critical to Equalizing Uninsurance Across States
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Source: Dubay, Hill and Kenney (2002) 1999 National Survey of America's Families, using 2000 SCHIP eligibility rules.

Figure 1 shows that, nationally in 1999, 11 percent of all children were
uninsured. Yet the rate of uninsurance for children ranged from a low of 3 percent
in Massachusetts to a high of 19 percent in Texas.' 58 As mentioned earlier, the

157. Genevieve Kenney et al., Health Insurance,Access, and Health Status of Children:Findings
from the National Survey ofAmerica 's Families, in ASSESSING THE NEW FEDERALISM, SNAPSHOTS OF

AMERICA'S FAMILIES II, at 3, available at http://www.urban.org/pdf/child-health.pdf (last visited Jan.
31, 2004); see also Alyssa Wigton & Alan Weil, Foreword,Snapshots ofAmerica's Families II. A View
of the Nation and 13 States from the National Survey of America's Families, in ASSESSING THE NEW
FEDERALISM, SNAPSHOTS OF AMERICA'S FAMILIES II, at 1, available at http://www.urban.org/pdf

/99foreword.pdf (last visited Jan. 31, 2004). The NSAF is a nationally representative sample of
households and families that focuses on the non-elderly population. The NSAF over-samples lowincome households in the thirteen states participating in the Assessing the New Federalism (ANF)
study. This sampling strategy allows analysts to make national and state level estimates in both the
study states and the balance of the nation.
158. Dubay et al., supra note 126, at 7. Texas and Mississippi had only implemented Phase 1 of
their SCHIP programs which phased in the coverage of older children living in poverty by 1999. These
states' Phase 2 expansions were not implemented until 2001. Uninsurance rates in these states
undoubtedly declined after implementation of Phase 2. Dubay et al., supra note 126, at 7.

2004]

ADVANCING TOWARD UNIVERSAL COVERAGE

share of children who are both uninsured and ineligible for Medicaid or SCHIP is
only 2 percent.' 59 Since 1999, states have implemented unprecedented efforts at
outreach and simplification of enrollment procedures. 160 In addition, during the
Clinton administration, the federal government put enormous pressure on states to
identify and enroll uninsured eligible Medicaid and SCHIP children. Since 1999,
more than 3.4 million children were enrolled in SCHIP and this picture likely looks
quite different.' 6 1 In 2001, uninsurance among children was at an all time low of
11.7 percent having fallen from 15.7 percent in 1998.162 So while the Medicaid
and SCHIP programs together do not assure complete universal coverage of
children, these federal-state programs offer the potential to reach this goal in the
near future.

The Bind of Budget Neutrality
A major limitation of the pincer strategy as a mechanism to achieve universal
coverage is the budget neutrality requirement, which is in effect whenever section
1115 demonstration waiver authority is used (this requirement therefore applies
under HIFA as well). 163 This statutory requirement mandates that section 111564
demonstration waivers be budget neutral with respect to the federal government.
Thus, in order to finance expansions in coverage to new populations, states must
show that the federal share of costs will not be greater under the waiver than they
would have been in the absence of the waiver. Coverage of expansion populations

159. Dubay et al., supra note 127, at 3. National estimates of eligibility under Medicaid and SCHIP
for all children and for uninsured children adjust for the fact that a share of foreign born non-citizen
children that appear to be eligible actually are not due to their immigration status. National estimates
are adjusted because the data are not available through the NSAF, or any other national survey, to
reliably estimate children's immigration status by state, and state estimates are presented only for
children who are citizens. Dubay et al., supra note 127, at 3.
160. Ian Hill, Charting New Courses for Children's Health Insurance, POL'Y & PRAC. OF PUB.
HUM. SERVICES, Dec. 2000, at 30, 34; Donna Cohen Ross & Ian T. Hill, Enrolling Eligible Children
and Keeping Them Enrolled, 13 THE FUTURE OF CHILD. 81, 83-84 (2003).
161. CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., THE STATE CHILDREN'S HEALTH INSURANCE
PROGRAM (SCHIP) AGGREGATE ENROLLMENT STATISTICS FOR THE 50 STATES AND THE DISTRICT OF

COLUMBIA

FOR

FEDERAL

FISCAL

YEAR

(FFY)

2000,

available at

http://cms.hhs.gov/schip

/enrollment/fy2000.pdf (last visited Feb. 4, 2004).
162. John Holahan, et al., Which ChildrenAre Still Uninsuredand Why? 13 FUTURE OF CHILD., 55,
57 (2003); ROBERT J. MILLS, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, CURRENT POPULATION REP. PUB. P60-220,
(Sept. 2002), available at http://www.census.gov/hhes
HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE: 2001, 1, 3 tl.

/www/hlthin0l.html (last visited Jan. 31, 2004). Uninsurance rates from the CPS cannot be directly
compared to those on the NSAF. See generally Shruti Rajan et al., Confirming Insurance Coverage in a
Telephone Survey: Evidence from the National Survey of America's Families, 37 INQUIRY 317 (2000)
(examining whether individuals with no reported insurance coverage are, in fact, uninsured).
163. 42 U.S.C. § 1315(e)(6) (2000).
164. Id.
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must therefore be financed by either cost savings obtained from the traditional
Medicaid populations (for example by placing these groups in managed care
arrangements), by re-allocating disproportionate share (DSH) program dollars that
in the absence of the waivers would have gone to providers, or by using unspent
SCHIP allocations.

165

States do not negotiate budget neutrality on equal financial footing. For
example, states vary widely in the extent to which they utilize DSH payments to
finance care for the indigent. DSH payments - as a share of total Medicaid
spending - range from less than 1 percent in twelve states, to 22 percent in
Louisiana.' 66 DSH spending per Medicaid recipient and per uninsured person
ranges from zero in some states, to $1,306 per Medicaid recipient in New
167
Hampshire and $1,167 per uninsured person in Missouri.
SCHIP funding allocations also vary considerably from state-to-state and,
from the programs' inception, there has been concern regarding both the size of the
SCHIP allotment and its allocation methodology. 168 In addition, while some states
have nearly exhausted their allotment, others have large surpluses available. New
York, for example, has legislative authority to expand coverage to parents up to
250 percent of the FPL, but has no SCHIP allocations available for the federal
match, while California has enough unspent SCHIP funds to meet the budget
neutrality requirements while expanding coverage of parents up to 250 percent of
69

the FPL.

1

With the passage of time, satisfaction of budget neutrality requirements has
proved more difficult for states given that most savings available from placing
populations into managed care have been realized. Furthermore, the availability of
DSH dollars and unspent SCHIP allocations have become increasingly limited.
The Center for Budget and Policy Priorities (CBPP) estimates that by fiscal year
2004, five states will have SCHIP allocations that are lower than needed to sustain

165. CINDY MANN, THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., THE NEW MEDICAID AND CHIP
WAIVER INITIATIVES, 16-17 (2002).

166. Teresa A. Coughlin & Stephen Zuckerman, States' Use of Medicaid Maximization Strategies
to Tap Federal Revenues: Program Implications and Consequences, in ASSESSING THE NEW
FEDERALISM,
DISCUSSION
PAPERS
02-09, June 2002,
at 13, tbl.l, available at
http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/310525_DP0209.pdf (last visited Jan. 31, 2004).
167. Id. at tbl.1.
168. See Frank Ullman et al., The State Children's Health Insurance Program: A Look at the
Numbers, in ASSESSING THE NEW FEDERALISM, OCCASIONAL PAPER No. 4, Mar. 1998, at 1-2,
available at http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/occ4.pdf (last visited Jan. 31, 2004); see also
Genevieve M. Kenney, et al., Three Years into SCHIP: What States Are and Are Not Spending, in NEW
FEDERALISM ISSUES AND OPTIONS FOR STATES I (Urb. Inst. Series A, NO. A-44, Wash., D.C.), Sept.
2000, availableat http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/anf a44.pdf (last visited Jan. 31, 2004).
169. See Howell, et al., supra note 139 (discussing New York); CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID
SERVS., HEALTH INSURANCE FLEXIBILITY AND ACCOUNTABILITY (HIFA) INITIATIVE FACT SHEET, at

http://cms.hhs.gov/hifa/cafactsh.asp (last modified May 23, 2002) (detailing California's Parental
Coverage Expansion Program); Kenney et al., supra note 168, at 3, tbl. 1.
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enrollment of children at projected levels, and that the number of states in this
circumstance will increase to twelve in fiscal year 2005.170 CBPP further estimates
that by 2007 as many as eighteen states could have spending levels that are higher
than their allotted funding.' 71 Cutting benefits or eligibility for Medicaid or SCHIP
populations to achieve savings to finance further expansions seems likely to be a
politically unpalatable option.
Finally, the characteristics of the uninsured easily illustrate the dilemma
imposed by the budget neutrality requirements. Using data from the 1999 NSAF,
Figure 2 presents information on the characteristics of the non-elderly uninsured.
Nineteen percent of non-elderly uninsured are children who are eligible for either
Medicaid or SCHIP under the eligibility rules in place in July of 2002.172 Twenty
percent of the uninsured are parents of these eligible children, some of whom are
eligible for Medicaid or SCHIP themselves. 73 Children who are ineligible for
either Medicaid or SCHIP and their parents constitute an additional 9 percent and 6
percent of the uninsured, respectively. 174 Finally, 46 percent of all non-elderly
uninsured are childless adults who would be considered expansion populations
under HIFA waivers. 175 Expansions to childless adults and parents who would be
served by separate child health programs would have to be financed through the
mechanisms mentioned above.
Cost savings from the existing program are unlikely to be found and those
that are available are unlikely to be utilized to finance expansions in coverage of
the non-elderly. Many of the services that have experienced rapid spending growth
in recent years, such as prescription drug coverage and nursing home care, are
optional services that are primarily provided to elderly and disabled populations
with strong political influence and high health care needs. These groups of
Medicaid enrollees are principally served at the option of states, which do not have
plans to cut eligibility or benefits. Since states have not previously cut these

170. EDWIN PARK ET AL., CENTER ON BUDGET & POL'Y PRIORITIES, OMB ESTIMATES INDICATE
THAT 900,000 CHILDREN WILL LOSE HEALTH INSURANCE DUE TO REDUCTIONS IN FEDERAL SCHIP

FUNDING II tbl.3 (Nov. 2002), available at http://www.cbpp.org/7-15-02health.pdf (last revised Nov.
7, 2002).
171. Id.
172. See fig.2. The share of non-elderly uninsured who are children eligible for Medicaid or SCHIP
is likely lower now given the increase in SCHIP, and possibly Medicaid, enrollment that has occurred
since 1999. Lisa Dubay et al., supra note 127, at 5-6.
173. See fig. 2.; Dubay et al., supranote 127, at 5.
174. See fig. 2. A share of ineligible children and their parents, as well as parents of eligible
children would be ineligible for Medicaid and/or SCHIP due to their immigration status. Dubay et al.,
supra note 127, at 3.
175. See fig. 2.; Dubay et al., supra note 127, at 4. See also CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID
SERVS., GUIDELINES FOR STATES INTERESTED IN APPLYING FOR A HIFA DEMONSTRATION, availableat

http://www.cms.gov/hifa/hifagde.asp. (last modified May 23, 2002).
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optional services and optional coverage groups to date, they are unlikely to do so to
finance expansions in coverage for the non-elderly in the near future.

Fiiyure 2176
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Differing State Burdens and FiscalCapacity
Even with a political commitment to expanding Medicaid and SCHIP to
cover a larger share of the uninsured, it is unlikely that all states could achieve
near-universal coverage because both the size of the uninsured population and the
fiscal capacity to solve the problem vary tremendously across states. Using data

176. Dubay et al., supra note 127; Lisa Dubay & Genevieve Kenney, Addressing Health Insurance
Coverage Gaps for Parents, HEALTH AFF. (forthcoming, 2004); Stephen Zuckerman et al., Shifting
Health Insurance Coverage, 1997-1999, 20 HEALTH AFF. 169, 169-75 (2001).
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from the 1997 through 1999 Current Population Survey (CPS), John Holahan
estimates that, on average, 18.2 percent of all non-elderly Americans were
uninsured and that the median state had an uninsurance rate of 15.9 percent.177 The
uninsurance rate varied considerably across states ranging from 9.8 and 10.7
percent in Minnesota and Rhode Island, respectively, to over 22 percent in Nevada,
Arkansas, Florida, Louisiana, California, New Mexico, Arizona, and topping off at
26.7 percent in Texas. 17 8
Variation in the rate of uninsurance across states is due to a number of
different factors including the extent of employer-sponsored coverage and state
policies that cover low-income populations. 179 According to Holahan, states'
uninsurance rates are principally determined by the extent to which employersponsored coverage exists rather than by eligibility for Medicaid and other state
coverage of individuals.' 80 For low-income populations, the uninsurance rate is
driven by both the extent of employer-sponsored coverage and coverage of
18 1
individuals under Medicaid and other state programs.
A recent study by Yu-Chu Shen and Stephen Zuckerman found that
differences between states in family income, education, race-ethnicity, and
citizenship of residents drive the variation in employer-sponsored coverage across
states, resulting in tremendous coverage gaps in states with low human capital and
only small gaps in those with high human capital. 182 At the same time, states that
expand public coverage to fill the gap left by the employer-sponsored insurance
market are those with higher per capita incomes, a greater share of residents with a
college education, a lower share of the population under 200 percent of the FPL, a
lower federal medical assistance percentage (FMAP), and a higher share of the
183
population voting for Gore or Nader in the 2000 election.
These findings imply that the states that have. the smallest uninsurance
problem and the greatest fiscal resources are those most likely to try to fill in the
gap left by employer-sponsored coverage with public health insurance programs.

177. John Holahan, Variations Among States in Health Insurance Coverage and Medical
Expenditures: How Much is Too Much?, ASSESSING THE NEW FEDERALISM, DISCUSSION PAPERS 02-

07, June 2002, at 9 tbl.1, 34 app.I, available at http://www.urban.org/template.cfm?sections
=research&NavMenulD= 141 &template=/taggedcontent/viewpublication.cfm&publicationlD=7802.
(last visited Jan. 31, 2004).
178. Id. at 34 app. 1.
179. Id. at 10.
180. Id. at II-12.
181. Id. at 12.
182. Yu-Chu Shen & Stephen Zuckerman, Why Is There State Variation In Employer-Sponsored
Insurance?,22 HEALTH AFF. 241, 241 (2003).
183. See Holahan & Pohl, supra note 79, at 33-34; see also Frank Ullman, et al., CHIP: A Look at
Emerging State Programs,in NEW FEDERALISM ISSUES AND OPTIONS FOR STATES 3-4 (Urb. Inst. Series

A, No. A-35, Wash., D.C.), Sept. 1999, available at http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/anf a35.pdf
(last visited Jan 31, 2004).
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Evidence from other studies supports these findings. In particular, Christopher
Trenholm and Susan Kung showed that states with higher per capita income spend
more than states with lower per capita income on filling the gap left by private
$1000 dollars of per capita income on
insurance and spend a greater share of every
1 84
uninsured.
being
for
risk
at
the populations
The FMAP is designed to ameliorate these differences in fiscal capacity
across states by providing a higher federal match to states with lower fiscal
capacity. 185 However, the FMAP does not address the fact that those states with
greater fiscal capacity have more expansive programs. As a result, states such as
New York, Rhode Island, Vermont, Maine, Massachusetts, and the District of
Columbia receive more than $1,500 in federal contributions for acute care services
per person under 200 percent of the FPL, while Montana, one of the poorest states
in the nation receives only $728.186 While some poor states do receive higher
levels of federal contribution per person under 200 percent of the FPL, such as
to compensate states equitably
Mississippi at $1,300, the FMAP does not appear
187
uninsured.
the
for
care
finance
to
ability
for their
It is clear from these analyses that states with low uninsurance rates tend to
be those that have the willingness and ability to address the problem. These states
tend to have greater fiscal capacity and allocate a larger share of resources to
solving the problem of the uninsured. In contrast, states with high uninsurance
rates face numerous obstacles to solving their uninsurance problem. States with
high uninsurance rates are more likely to have low per-capita income. 188 States
with low per-capita income spend less per person at risk of being uninsured and
also have lower fiscal efforts given their capacity. 189 The FMAP accounts for
some, but not all of these differences. 190 Thus states in these circumstances that are
interested in expanding coverage will likely need to develop different solutions to
the problem than those that work for states with smaller problems and greater
resources.
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15 (Dec. 2000), available at http://www.statecoverage.net/pdf/disparities.pdf (last visited
Jan. 31, 2004).
185. Id. at 23.
186. John Holahan & Alan Weil, Block Grants are the Wrong Prescriptionfor Medicaid, 6 HEALTH
FORTUNE?

POL'Y ONLINE 9 tbl.1 (2002), at http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/900624_HPOnline_6.pdf (last
visited Jan. 31, 2004).
187. Id. at 9-10.
188. TRENHOLM & KUNG, supra note 184, at 15, 23; Holahan & Pohl, supra note 79, at 2.
189. See TRENHOLM & KUNG, supra note 184, at 19.
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The CurrentFiscal Crisis and Others That May Come
With the economic expansion in the late 1990s, all states made unprecedented
efforts to expand coverage to new populations. The downturn in the economy,
changes within the health care system, and increasing Medicaid spending growth
makes it unlikely that states will take the lead in expanding public insurance
coverage. It is more likely that states will struggle to maintain enrollment in their
current programs.
Almost all states have balanced budget requirements that require them to
balance their budgets by the close of the Fiscal Year, and therefore, they may not
carry a deficit. 19 1 State political officials take this requirement seriously and it
often limits their willingness to commit funding from state coffers for significant
public service expansions. 192 The balanced budget constraint is even tighter when
one considers the fact that most state laws require supermajorities to approve
certain tax or expenditure decisions. 193 As a result, state political officials are wary
of putting their state in a position of increased expenditures when they have little
ability to raise additional revenues (aside from cutting spending on existing
programs) in the face of budget deficits. The results of a survey conducted by the
National Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL) in April 2003 showed that, in
order to balance their budgets, two-thirds of the states needed to reduce their
budgets by nearly $26 billion by June 30.194 This is an increase from the previous
estimates made in the fall of 2002, resulting in a gap of $17.5 billion.' 9 NCSL
reports that states have had to use rainy day or other funds, delay capital projects,
and cut Medicaid, education and corrections spending (twenty-nine states imposed
96
across-the-board budget cuts) to balance their budgets. 1
Changes taking place within the health care sector have also had important
ramifications on state budgets. The squeezing of some of the "excess fat" out of
the health care system-which has occurred within both the public and private
sector-has also played a role in exacerbating state budget deficits. For example,
many states were able to control Medicaid costs in the early 1990s when they
moved to mandatory enrollment of Medicaid recipients into managed care
arrangements. 197 After a decade of efficiency gains, states are no longer reaping

191. WEISSERT & WEISSERT, supranote 81, at 208; Thompson, supra note 82, at 47-48.
192. Thompson, supra note 82, at 47-48; WEISSERT & WEISSERT, supra note 82, at 208.
193. Thompson, supra note 82, at 48.
194. NAT'L. CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, STATE BUDGET UPDATE: APRIL 2003 1-2
(2003).
195. NAT'L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, STATE BUDGET UPDATE: NOVEMBER 2002

(2002); Press Release, Nat'l. Conference of State Legislatures, New National Survey Reports State
Budgets Fall $17.5 Billion Short, (Nov. 22, 2002).
196. NAT'L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, supra note 194, at 1-4.
197. WEISSERT & WEISSERT, supra note 8 1, at 222-24.
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The federal
considerable cost savings from Medicaid managed care. 198
government also tightened rules around DSH payments, funding for graduate
medical education (GME) and the upper payment limit (UPL). 199 Rising
pharmaceutical costs are driving costs up for all state-funded programs, including
benefits for state employees, Medicaid recipients, and SCHIP enrollees. 200 Finally,
the 1999 U.S. Supreme Court decision Olmstead v. L.C.20 1 required states to
provide community-based alternatives to institutionalization, and may also prove
to be a financial burden for states. Many states have not made significant changes
to their delivery systems as a result of this decision, believing that existing
programs for home and community based services were sufficient for compliance.
However, there are a number of cases working their way through the courts that
may change how states must respond and in the process require significant
financial investment.20 2
In Fiscal Years 2001 and 2002, the percentage increase in state Medicaid
spending grew at a rate of about 12 percent, while the percentage increase in total
state spending grew at a rate of about 6 percent. 20 3 Spending increases did not
occur consistently across the populations or the services covered by Medicaid.20 4
According to Vern Smith, Medicaid enrollment growth is occurring faster than at

198. See WEISSERT & WEISSERT, supra note 81, at 224.
199. NAT'L ASS'N OF URBAN HOSP., POSITION STATEMENT ON: MEDICAID DISPROPORTIONATE
SHARE (April 2003), at http://www.nauh.org/Docs/positions/ppmedicaid dsh.pdf (last visited Jan. 31,
2004); Press Release, Department of Health and Human Services, HHS Issues Upper Payment Limit
Regulation (Jan. 5, 2001), at http://www.hhs.gov/news/press/2001pres/200l0l05.html (last visited Jan.
31, 2004).
200. See WEISSERT & WEISSERT, supra note 81, at 224.
201. 527 U.S. 581 (1999). The Olmstead decision requires states to make additional expenditures
unless the state can prove that requiring to make the additional expenditures "would be so unreasonable
given the demands of the State's mental health budget." Id. at 595.
202. See, e.g., Susan J. et al. v. Riley et al., No. 00-CV-918 (M.D. Ala.) (alleging that Alabama
failed to furnish intermediate care facilities for mentally retarded individuals or home and communitybased services to eligible individuals); Tessa G. v. Arkansas Department of Human Services et al., No.
03cv493 (E.D. Ark.) (challenging Arkansas' practice of wait listing individuals for its HCBS waiver
program for people with disabilities rather than letting them submit an application); Bruggeman et al v.
Blagojevich et al., No. 00-cv-5392 (N.D. Ill.) (alleging Illinois does not furnish Medicaid services to
eligible individuals with reasonable promptness nor afford individuals freedom of choice in selecting
between ICF/MR and HCB waiver services). For more information, see GARY A. SMITH, HUMAN
SERVS.
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any time since 1992.205 While enrollment growth is concentrated among lowincome families and children, spending growth is concentrated among the elderly
and disabled who account for approximately 70 percent of all Medicaid
spending.2 °6 Of special concern to states are increases in prescription drug
spending with annual increases of 19.7 percent between 1998 and 2000 and
accounting for a large share of Medicaid costs. 20 7 These increases are likely to
continue and are consistent with overall trends occurring in the private market.20 8
In addition, the increase in Medicaid spending comes at a time when state tax
revenues are falling rapidly-by about 20 percent between the second quarter of
Fiscal Year 1999 and the second quarter of 2002.209
A number of studies have examined the response of states with respect to
these recent fiscal crises and each report somewhat different findings. 210 Findings
from case studies conducted in early 2002 suggested that states were not planning
to implement broad reductions in payments to providers or cuts in eligibility,
although these types of reductions in spending were being used. 211 A more recent
survey of states, however, indicates that since fiscal year 2002, fifty states reported
reducing or freezing provider rates for at least one provider group, while forty-six
implemented prescription drug cost controls.2 12 Medicaid benefits were reduced at
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/reprint/hlthaff.w2.187v.pdf (last visited Jan. 31, 2004) (describing how changed budgetary
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least one time during the period Fiscal Year 2002 through Fiscal Year 2004 by
thirty-five states and thirty-four reduced or restricted Medicaid eligibility during
the same tie period.213 During Fiscal Year 2003, seventeen states increased
beneficiary cost sharing, and twenty-one states instituted new or higher
copayments in Fiscal Year 2004.214 In addition, some states have cut outreach
efforts in order to reduce enrollment growth among low-income children. 21 5
Estimates by the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities indicate that as many as
1.7 million individuals would lose their Medicaid, SCHIP or state-sponsored health
insurance coverage if all of the proposed cuts were implemented.216

WHAT WOULD IT TAKE FOR STATES TO TAKE THE LEAD?

The debate regarding the tradeoffs inherent in solving the problem of the
uninsured at the federal or the state level has roots in Madison's FederalistPaper
No. 10.217 The entitlement nature of Medicaid gives the federal government
tremendous authority over the program and allows state flexibility to the extent
that such flexibility is consistent with federal objectives. A distinct advantage of
this approach lies in the greater ability of the federal government to redistribute
income. In contrast, the block grant nature of SCHIP provides more flexibility to
states than does Medicaid, but caps the federal financial commitment to the
program and offers fewer protections to beneficiaries.
This current maze of Medicaid and SCHIP programs, including the HIFA
waivers that encompass both programs, is unlikely to produce solutions to the
problem of the uninsured by states or an equitable distribution of federal resources
across states. As noted, prior to SCHIP states were given the option to extend
eligibility for Medicaid to all of the children that are now eligible for SCHIP but
failed to do so. Based on extensive case studies in eighteen states, Ian Hill
reported that states were consistent in the reasons they cited for choosing to take
advantage of covering children under SCHIP, but that they varied in the weight
they attributed to the reasons.218 Among the key incentives mentioned by public
officials and other stake-holders were the enhanced federal match, the increased
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flexibility with respect to benefits and cost-sharing, the option to cover children
under a program that was not an entitlement, and the ability to develop strategies to
21 9
prevent crowd-out.
Hill argues that the flexibility offered under SCHIP encouraged states to take
ownership of the program and to be more creative in its design and
implementation, which, in turn, made governors and other stakeholders more
committed to its success. 220 Moreover, as more states implemented programs and
advocates clamored for expansions in eligibility, political pressure was asserted on
governors who might otherwise have been less inclined to expand coverage.22'
Finally, the strong economy and, in some states, the presence of tobacco settlement
revenues made it easier for states to finance the program than it would have been in
the early 1990s.

222

All of these factors combined to encourage the creation of

SCHIP programs in each state and the District of Columbia.
The SCHIP program provides an important example of federal-state
partnership in addressing the problem of the uninsured. Unfortunately, at least part
of states' success can be attributed to the significant financial commitment at the
federal level, the strong economy, the growing political momentum to cover
children, the low medical cost inflation during the late 1990s, and, in some states,
the availability of tobacco settlement funds to finance their programs. 3
Today, states face quite different circumstances. The U.S. is experiencing
slow economic growth, so while Medicaid budgets are growing at the fastest rate
since the mid-1990s, state revenues are falling (and will fall further because state
income taxes are linked to federal tax rates, which are going through another round
of cuts). 224

At the same time, federal resources to expand coverage under

Medicaid and SCHIP are all but frozen. Together, these trends suggest that only
states that are politically committed to universal coverage and have high fiscal
capacity, are likely to take the lead in the near future. It will be critical to follow
the progress made in California and Maine toward universal coverage, as well as
other states where the groundwork has been laid through state planning grants from
HRSA.
Due to the issues outlined above, the pincer strategy of health insurance
expansion is unlikely to allow states to take the lead in solving the uninsurance
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problem in today's environment. And while HIFA waivers offer a partial federalist
strategy to solve the problem by granting increased flexibility for states, the lack of
federal financial commitment to expand coverage to new groups and the legal
constraints of ERISA preclude this option from achieving anything but marginal
gains in insurance coverage. Moreover, the use of HIFA waivers has the potential
to institutionalize interstate inequities in federal financing that are inconsistent with
national objectives.
The path to universal coverage cannot rest solely on state leadership. It
requires a national commitment to provide greater state flexibility and to supply
additional federal dollars to states willing to initiate action towards universal
coverage. This would require legislation at the federal level to allocate resources
to cover uninsured populations that, as a nation,225we have been unwilling to coverin particular, adults with and without children.
The problem of the uninsured cannot be solved through costs savings under
the Medicaid and SCHIP programs. Even in the best of economic times, states
were unable to solve the problem of uninsured children in the absence of increased
federal funding. In addition, the methodology regarding the use of reallocated
DSH payments and unspent SCHIP allocations to achieve budget neutrality would
have to be reformed to reflect a more rational system based on state burdens and
fiscal capacity.
Even if additional federal funds were authorized, not all states would expand
coverage. Some states would be unable to come up with the state share of
spending needed to expand coverage, while others would not have the political will
to solve the problem. 226 Moreover, unless a successful challenge to ERISA
occurs, states will be unable to assure that private dollars already in the system
remain there and will be unable to rely on employers as a source of revenues to
finance care for the working uninsured.
In Lindblom's analysis, government is typically only capable of incremental
adjustments to the status quo because the many participants in the policy process
can only reach agreement on discrete problems, not basic goals. 227 This suggests
that without a major shift in economic or political conditions, a comprehensive
single-payer system is unlikely to occur in the U.S. in the near future. Nevertheless
advocates of such a policy would be well served by starting to build the political
agenda for universal coverage now. Barring an unexpected major federal
initiative, the only hope for obtaining universal coverage is through federally-

225. See also Joseph White, Three Meanings of Capacity: Or, Why the Federal Government is Most
Likely to Lead on Insurance Access Issues, 28 J. HEALTH POL., POL'Y & L. 217 (2003); Michael S.
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supported and potentially mandated state action. This strategy has the potential to
allow states to develop unique insurance systems that are appropriate to their
political and structural circumstances and to achieve a necessary redistribution of
financial support across states. However, this strategy would require a major
restructuring of state options and financing and a federal commitment to universal
coverage. In the absence of these changes, tens of millions of individuals and their
families will continue to suffer the health and economic consequences of being
uninsured, and tremendous variation in insurance coverage across states will
remain.

